Heidegger and Husserl on Metaphysical Neutrality


« Intentio et Adaequatio : Heidegger, Husserl, et la neutralisation de la métaphysique » (“Intentio and Adaequatio. Heidegger and Husserl on metaphysical neutrality”)
in Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale, 2015 (3), p. 329-352

Abstract: This article asks whether Heidegger’s admiration for the 6th Logical Investigation is to be understood as an acknowledgement that Husserl somehow succeeded in guaranteeing the ‘metaphysical neutrality’ of phenomenology, and answers negatively. Indeed, Heidegger provided two different readings of Husserl’s correspondence theory of truth, first in his 1925 lectures on the history of the concept of time, then in his last seminar in Zahringen in 1973.

Martin Heidegger
Martin Heidegger

The analysis of the 1973 seminar, which is the most well known and the most often mentioned, consists in a heavy criticism of the analogy between simple and categorial perception. However, this criticism misses the originality of Husserl’s use of the concept of analogy in the last section of the 6th Logical Investigation and disregards the irreducible distinction between simple and categorial acts. The 1925 lectures, on the other hand, provide a more charitable account of categorial intuition that endorses a holistic approach of perception. The analyses developed in this article shed new light on an allegedly well-known topic, and stress the specificity of Husserl’s phenomenology within the history of metaphysics. They highlight the interest of Husserl’s approach of perception and the subtlety of his analysis of categorial intuition.