Finally, these three facets of my research led me to critically interrogate the extent and limits of phenomenological experience. This part of my research constitutes an extension of the analyses developed in my book on Husserl and meets some of the difficulties met in my most recent investigations on self-knowledge. How far are we legitimated to extend the phenomenological description of one’s experiences? How can we determine the scope and draw the boundaries of our ability to determine the meaning of our lived-experiences through first-person descriptions? What kind of metaphysics does phenomenology imply or bring about? I recently started to raise such questions in a few articles (see below) and I intend to develop them further through my involvement in a research collaborative project between the University of Lisbon and the University of Lille III (“The Phenomenon, Cartography of a fundamental Concept”).
- “Ways of being given. Marion and Husserl on the bounds of givenness“, in S. Lofts, A. Calcagno (eds.) Breached Horizons: The Work of Jean-Luc Marion (forthcoming in 2017)
- “Saying ‘I’. On the vacuity of self-presence in Derrida and Husserl“, in Discipline Filosofiche XXV, 1 (« Figures, Functions and Critique of Subjectivity »), 2016
- “Intentio and Adaequatio. Heidegger and Husserl on metaphysical neutrality”, Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale, 2015 (3), p. 329-352