« Le réel et ses signes. Brentano et Husserl sur l’engagement ontologique de l’intentionnalité » (“Reality and its signs. Brentano and Husserl on the existential import of intentionality”)
in C. Esposito, P. Porro, Quaestio 11, « Intentionality and Reality », Turnhout – Bari, Brepols, 2013, p. 243-262
Abstract: In spite of Brentano’s considerable influence on Husserl’s Logical Investigations, their analysis of intentionality is significantly different regarding some fundamental points, such as the status of reality, the nature of intentional acts, and their relation to the world. The core of the opposition between Brentano and Husserl is to be found in the ontological background of their theories, as a result of which they hold two different approaches of the existential import of intentionality. This article investigates those differences in order to ask whether a relational understanding of intentionality is likely to give a satisfying account of reality. Both Brentano and Husserl’s analyses provide important clues regarding this issue and stress the main difficulties of the question, even if their theories fail to take into consideration the actual insertion of intentional acts within the world. This work is important since it allows me to scrutinize an intrinsic difficulty of the concept of intentionality and to propose an alternative phenomenological account of reality based on Husserl’s theory of indexical meanings.