

C-MLAG 2016

SELF-KNOWLEDGE AND THE FIRST PERSON



Paul Klee, Insula Dulcamara (1921-1938). Zentrum Paul Klee (Bern)

Participants

Anna Ciaunica (University of Porto - IF)
Carlos João Correia (University of Lisbon)
Charles Travis (King's College London / University of Porto - IF)
Eylem Özaltun (Koç University – Istanbul)
Jean-Philippe Narboux (University of Bordeaux)
Naomi Eilan (University of Warwick)
Pierre-Jean Renaudie (University of Porto - IF)
Ouassim Cassam (University of Warwick)
Richard Moran (Harvard University)
Samuel Webb (Univ. Paris-Sorbonne)
Sofia Miguens (University of Porto - IF)
Vincent Descombes (EHESS - Paris)

16 - 17 June 2016

Sala de Reuniões
Sala do Departamento de Filosofia

REGISTRATION IS FREE, BUT REQUIRED
EMAIL: ifilosofia@letras.up.pt

Organizing Committee

Sofia Miguens (University of Porto - IF)
Bruno Ambroise (CNRS)
Pierre-Jean Renaudie (University of Porto - IF)
Eylem Özaltun (Koç University – Istanbul)

Organização:

Research Group Mind Language and Action Group (MLAG)
Instituto de Filosofia da Universidade do Porto - FIL/00502



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SELF-KNOWLEDGE AND THE FIRST PERSON

'Self-knowledge' is a standard rubric under which a variety of central and perennial problems in philosophy sort. These questions span the areas of philosophy of mind, philosophy of action, epistemology, and to some extent philosophy of language. Analysing the problems related to self-knowledge, Wittgenstein has developed two coordinated lines of thought. One line stresses the importance of third-person perspective with respect to mental life in order to resist introspectionism and discard the illusion of inscrutability of other minds. The other line of thought meets Frege's idea according to which, in ordinary forms of self-awareness, one is presented to oneself as one is presented to no other. This conception affords first-person perspective a particular status, not by virtue of special access to some specific realm of facts over which one allegedly exercises expertise, but rather by virtue of the particular kind of authority and authorship one claims to enjoy with respect to one own mental life.

The C-MLAG conference includes a selection of leading scholars addressing these questions from different perspectives: some starting from problems in philosophy of psychology, some from problems in logic and language, some from concerns with the relation of philosophy to ordinary life.

PROGRAM

Day 1 | 16 June 2016 Problems of Self-knowledge

Morning | Sala de Reuniões

11h00 | Quassim Cassam (Univ. Warwick)
Diagnostic Error, Overconfidence and Self-Knowledge

(discussant: E. Özaltun)

12h30-14h00: Lunch Break

Afternoon | Sala do Departamento de Filosofia

14h00 | Charles Travis (KCL / Univ. Porto)

A day at the supermarket

(discussant: S. Miguens):

How the psychological meets the logical, or: what Perry and Dr. Lauben cannot think

15h30-16h00: Break

16h00 | Naomi Eilan (Univ. Warwick)

Other 'I's

(discussant: A. Ciaunica)

Day 2 | 17 June 2016 Action and the First-person

Morning | Sala do Departamento de Filosofia

BOOK SYMPOSIUM:

V. Descombes, *Le parler de soi*

10h00 | Richard Moran (Harvard University)
The most recent death of the subject'

11h00 | Vincent Descombes (EHESS)
Answers to Richard Moran

11h30 | Jean-Philippe Narboux (Univ. Bordeaux)
First-Person Thoughts and the Middle Voice

12h30-14h00: Lunch Break

Afternoon | Sala do Departamento de Filosofia

14h00 | Pierre-Jean Renaudie (Univ. Porto)

14h45 | Eylem Özaltun (Koç Univ.)

15h30 | Samuel Webb (Univ. Paris-Sorbonne)

16h15-16h45: Break

16h45 | Sofia Miguens (Univ. Porto)

17h30 | Carlos João Correia (Univ. Lisbon)

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